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ABSTRACT 
 
What explains variation in tax outcomes? Many studies emphasize the role played by institutions, 
focusing on those of relatively recent times. We argue that contemporary tax systems have deeper 
institutional origins in the early modern period when states undertook reforms to centralize and 
rationalize taxation. We argue that the varying outcomes of these reforms map onto contemporary 
tax outcomes through the mechanisms of state capacity and social norms. Where states succeeded 
in introducing more comprehensive reforms they developed higher capacity to extract more tax, 
more equitably, and developing direct fiscal contracts with social groups below elites, fostering 
norms of trust. We test our argument using the extent of cadastral registration of land in the early 
modern period. We find that on average countries where reforms were more extensive have higher 
tax revenues, state capacity and trust in state authorities today than countries with limited early 
modern tax reforms. 
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The recent fiscal crises in some European countries have again made clear the stark differences 
between these states in terms of their fiscal sustainability.  While most existing accounts of diver-
gent tax outcomes explain these patterns in terms of institutional differences dating from the mod-
ern period – regime type, constitutional structure, electoral systems, parties and industrial relations 
– some contemporary tax systems bear a striking resemblance to their predecessors in the early 
modern period, as illustrated by the contrasting examples of Sweden and Greece. 
 
Sweden is often seen as one of the strongest and most stable tax states, able to collect tax from its 
citizens and use this money to fund a substantial welfare state. According to Steinmo, “the hall-
marks of the Swedish tax system have been its broad base, its stability and its high yield” (1993, 41). 
While his explanations for this impressive tax performance focus on the institutional framework 
established in the last one hundred years, the modern Swedish tax state is remarkably similar to that 
of the early modern period. From the 1530s onwards, the Swedish state began replacing medieval 
fiscal systems, where elites were used as intermediaries, with a centralized, rationalized system of 
taxation administered by state officials that was capable of extracting high levels of resources from 
the bulk of the population. As an innovator in establishing centralized tax records and creating the 
first nation-wide cadastral map by surveying individual land parcels, the state had acquired the in-
formation necessary to directly “supervise and scrutinize the peasants” (Lindkvist 1987, 62). With 
this formidable fiscal monitoring capacity the Swedish state had created a broad-based tax system 
that could extract taxes, both in cash and in kind, from a relatively poor economy, sufficient to 
support one of the largest standing armies in Europe (Tilly 1992, 59) and to become an imperial 
power in mainland Europe. In the early modern period Sweden was already one of the most im-
pressive tax states. 
 
By contrast, contemporary Greece is one of the weakest tax states among the advanced European 
states. In the 1600s when Sweden was developing centralized, broad based taxation, in Greece, then 
part of the Ottoman Empire, taxes were collected through extensive use of tax farming (Balla and 
Johnson 2009). Tax farmers, members of the elite who were not state officials, paid the state up 
front and any additional revenue collected was kept as profit.1 This system persisted for the next 
three hundred years. It was not until the nineteenth century that the Ottomans undertook reforms. 
However, as Greece became independent in 1833, it missed the introduction of the Ottoman Land 
                                                     
1
 For an overview of the variety of tax collection methods under tax farming see Coşgel and Miceli 2009. 
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Code of 1858, which required the state registration of land. Since independence, the state has faced 
persistent budget deficits and a high debt-to-GDP ratio (Lazaretou 2014). Greece still does not 
have comprehensive land and property registration systems (Markatos 2014). Taxation is “the es-
sential function that makes government possible and the one that the modern Greek state has nev-
er quite mastered in almost two centuries of existence” (Palaiologos 2014, 32). 
 
The points of continuity between the early modern and contemporary Swedish and Greek tax states 
raise questions about how far back we need to look to explain the variation in tax outcomes be-
tween European states. This paper analyzes to what extent, and in what ways, early modern tax 
systems in European states explain the variation in contemporary tax outcomes. In the early mod-
ern period the rulers of European states were engaged in efforts to reform fiscal systems. We con-
tend that the extent to which reform happened in the early modern period had consequences for 
how much tax was collected, the distribution of the tax burden, the strength of the state and the 
relationship between the majority of the population and the state. We argue that where states began 
collecting tax directly they developed stronger states, capable of extracting more tax, more equita-
bly, and developing direct fiscal contracts with social groups below elites, fostering norms of trust 
in the state. On the basis of these arguments we predict that the outcome of early modern tax re-
forms have an effect on contemporary tax outcomes through the mechanisms of state capacity and 
social norms, particularly trust in the state. We test our argument using a new measure of the extent 
and quality of state-administered cadastral records of land, which taps into the timing, extent and 
depth of tax reforms. Our analysis suggests that on average countries where tax reforms were un-
dertaken earlier and more comprehensively have higher tax revenues, stronger state capacity and 
higher trust than countries where reform was more limited.  
 
We contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, we add a new explanatory variable to 
existing explanations by focusing on institutional development in the long run and emphasizing the 
importance of the early modern period. Second, we suggest theoretical mechanisms for how institu-
tional legacies in the area of taxation might persist – state capacity and social norms. Third, we test 
our hypotheses with a new measure of the extent and quality of state-administered cadastral records 
that taps into the success of tax reforms in the early modern period. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we review the literature on modern tax systems, 
which focuses on the micro-behavioral foundations of compliance in societal norms and macro-
  5 
institutional environment, particularly recent institutional characteristics. We then discuss taxation 
in the early modern period, drawing on the very rich literature which has analyzed the formative 
relationship between taxation, state-building and state-society relations in this period. We use this as 
the backdrop for a theoretical discussion that puts forward testable hypotheses. We then describe 
our data and empirical strategy and the results of the analysis. We conclude by considering the im-
plications of our argument for the fiscal sustainability of contemporary European states. 
 
Existing Explanations of Contemporary Tax Outcomes 
 
Many classic works in the social sciences have addressed the variation in tax outcomes. Beyond the 
basic economic variables that clearly matter – the size and structure of the economy – the literature 
has focused on two main areas: the micro-behavioral foundations of compliance related to societal 
norms and the macro-institutional environment.  
 
In terms of the micro-behavioral foundations of taxation, as originally modeled by economists, 
compliance was simply a function of the individual’s calculation about the probability of being 
caught evading and penalized (Allingham and Sandmo 1972).  However, subsequent empirical stud-
ies showed that some countries with low enforcement rates still have comparatively high compli-
ance levels, suggesting that factors beyond deterrence influenced tax behavior (Alm, Sanchez, and 
De Juan 1995).  
 
In terms of explaining this gap, researchers have put forward a number of explanations. First, the 
fiscal exchange framework, which envisages a contract between citizens who pay tax and states who 
provide services in return, maintains that taxpayers “will meet obligations to pay taxes, but only if 
other taxpayers and the state also meet their obligations to the implicit tax contract” (Scholz 2003, 
190). Within this framework the focus has been on the importance of the taxpayers’ perceptions 
that the public goods received are appropriate and of equivalent value to the payments made 
(Becker et al 1987; Bordignon 1993; Cummings et al 2009; Levi, Sachs, and Tyler 2009) and that 
other citizens are not shirking on their tax obligations (Castro and Rizzo 2014; Fortin, Lacroix and 
Villeval 2007; Moser, Evans, and Kim 1995; Scholz and Lubell 1998). Second, in what is known as 
the “slippery slope” framework, power of and trust in authorities have been at the center of theo-
retical and empirical investigation of tax behavior (Kirchler, Hoelzel and Wahl 2008). Finally, there 
are those who have focused on tax morale – the “intrinsic motivation to pay tax” (Torgler 2007, 4) 
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which is determined by a range of individual and system-level factors (Alm and Torgler 2006, Lago-
Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010). 
 
This first literature suggests that much of what determines tax behavior at the micro level is derived 
from the broader institutional environment, which is the focus of a second literature. At the most 
basic level the institutional literature has considered the impact of regime type on tax outcomes 
(Cheibub 1998; Boix 2003; Ross 2004). Beyond regime type studies have found that differences 
between democracies also matter: majoritarian systems seem to produce less redistribution than 
proportional systems (Wilensky 2002), and there is also a positive link between leftist parties and 
higher levels of taxation (Allers, De Haan, and Sterks 2001; Cusak and Beramendi 2006), although 
left governments may also champion larger tax cuts than right ones (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998, 
338). Strong corporatism and unionization also have a positive impact on taxation (Crepaz 1992; 
Hall and Soskice 2001; Steinmo and Tolbert 1989).  
 
Some of the most influential institutionalist accounts adopt a “whole systems” approach, looking at 
how institutional structures in their totality affect tax. Steinmo’s (1993) influential study argues that 
institutions structure how power is exercised and thereby provide the context that determines both 
how policy makers view the choices available to them and how policy will be implemented.  States 
with “centripetal” constitutions (unitary states with parliamentary systems and proportional elec-
toral systems) can collect more tax (Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno 2005). This is congruent with 
the “number of veto players” argument (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998; Besley and Persson 2014). 
The institutionalist literature on modern tax systems often draws on research on taxation in earlier 
periods that has emphasized the key role tax played in European institutional development, yet the 
institutions it examines as explanatory variables for current tax outcomes are those that arose in 
relatively recent times, leaving open questions about the effect of earlier patterns of development.  
 
Taxation in the Early Modern Period 
 
A very rich literature has analyzed the formative developments in taxation, state-building and state-
society relations in the early modern period in Europe. According to a classic literature, war created 
a revenue imperative that required the development of tax and new forms of administration (Brew-
er 1988; Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Hintze 1975; Tilly 1990). A more recent literature examining 
the variation in fiscal outcomes of early modern states in Europe in the context of warfare, high-
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lights an interaction effect between economic structure and political regime type (Karaman and 
Pamuk 2013), centralized states with representative institutions (Dincecco 2009) and unified and 
powerful voting institutions (Kiser and Linton 2001). While this literature has contributed richly to 
our understanding of tax outcomes in the early modern period, a question that is unexplored is how 
the variation in fiscal capacity that emerged in this period may matter for tax outcomes today. To 
address it we need to explore the ways in which tax systems were reformed in this period. 
 
Early Modern Tax Reforms 
 
In the early modern period European states began reforming medieval tax systems, with varying 
degrees of success. Rulers’ escalating need for revenue, particularly after the military revolution 
from 1550 onwards (Tilly 1990; Downing 1992), led to the need to reform systems of taxation.  
Medieval tax systems involved collective obligations on towns and villages, administered by the 
local nobility. The state had neither the capacity nor the information necessary to collect taxes di-
rectly without using elites as intermediaries (Scott 1998, 38).  
 
The more effective tax systems that emerged in some European countries in the early modern peri-
od moved from the medieval system of collective obligations administered by the elite, towards a 
centralized, rationalized model that used state officials to collect tax directly (Dincecco 2009).  
These reformed systems had at least three important consequences; for tax levels, the distribution 
of the tax burden, and the directness of the tax relationship between the state and ordinary people.  
First, direct, centralized state-administered systems were more efficient at raising revenue 
(Dincecco 2009). This was in part because they did not have to negotiate separate rates with differ-
ent local elites (Dincecco 2009, 51) and in part because of reduced collection losses, as happened 
for example, in the Ottoman empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where central 
revenues remained low because “more than half… of the gross tax receipts were retained by vari-
ous intermediaries, most importantly the urban elites in the provinces” (Pamuk 2014, 5; see also 
Karaman 2009).  
 
Rationalized, centralized tax collection led to not only more tax being collected, but also to a fairer 
distribution of the tax burden. Feudal taxation was highly unevenly distributed. For example, in 
France under the pre-Revolutionary taille system communities were held collectively responsible for 
a fixed tax burden. Who paid what was largely at the discretion of local elites who collected the 
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taxes, meaning the tax burden was not always equitably distributed (Schremmer 1989). This was 
detrimental to both the royal income and to local communities (Touzery 2002, 136). These dispari-
ties were a key source of grievance on the eve of the French Revolution (White 1995). Similarly, 
summarizing a large literature on pre-1800 tax systems in England, Kiser and Kane state that  
 
“…taxes never adequately tapped subjects’ wealth” (2001, 200). Eighteenth 
century reformers in Italy identified inequalities of taxation “not only between 
one province and another, or one town and another ... but also among the in-
dividual tax-payers in a single village. This was a consequence of the degree to 
which the power to distribute and collect taxes was in the hands of local ad-
ministrators who generally had ties to the large land owners that appointed 
the tax collectors, themselves” (Capra 2002, 129).   
 
Reforms in some countries were explicitly focused on equalizing the unfair distribution of taxation. 
In France efforts to collect more accurate information on land holdings, the cadastre parcellaire, was 
designed “to be an instrument of government fiscal policy to ensure the fair calculation and appor-
tionment of land tax commune by commune and property by property” (Kain and Baigent 1992, 
233). In Italy, reforms in Savoy and Milan took discretionary powers away from traditional authori-
ties and empowered an administration that was “able to guarantee fiscal equality and public wellbe-
ing” (Alimento 2002, 120). In these cases, as in others, the pursuit of centralization was linked to 
the attempt to decrease the fiscal privileges of elites (Alimento 2002, 122). 
 
A third consequence of fiscal reforms was that it brought ordinary people into direct contact with 
the state, as opposed to the interface through noble intermediaries under tax farming, allowing a 
direct relationship to emerge. In Sweden, as the crown had begun collecting tax directly as early as 
the sixteenth century, “the state bureaucracy extended its monitoring directly to peasants and la-
bourers” (Tilly 1990, 136). Peasants regularly challenged tax assessments, and their grievances were 
dealt with directly by state officials in a number of ways (Frohnert 2001; Hallenberg 2012, Hallen-
berg, Holm and Johansson 2008). The essence of the Swedish state, set forth by Gustav Vasa, “was 
a new fiscal and military organization… But the by-product was a system of interaction that opened 
up direct communication lines between the King and his subjects” (Hallenberg, Holm and Johans-
son 2008, 254). By contrast, in the Ottoman empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,  
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“…the tax farmer or his agent was at total liberty to use a multitude of means 
to realize his objective, and peasants no longer had any way of acquiring real 
protection against these” (Kasaba 1988, 13). 
 
Thus successful reforms had important consequences for taxation, equity and state-society rela-
tions. However, these reforms were not as comprehensive in every state, as rulers faced significant 
resistance from elites because reforms undercut their social power at the local level and increased 
their tax burden. Rationalizing and centralizing tax collection involved limiting the fiscal privileges 
and political “freedoms” of the elite (Alimento 2002, 122), transferring to the state the aristocracy’s 
coercion-based extractive capacity and displacing nobles as the key representatives of the state in 
the locality (Anderson 1974). As a result these reforms were keenly resisted. For example, in France 
the Frondes (1648-1653) – a series of armed conflicts between the French Crown and the French 
nobility – was sparked by the attempts of Louis XIV to limit the privileges of local elites in general 
and to increase central control of direct tax administration in particular (Chapman 2004 70-72; 
Kiser and Kane 2010, 203). 
 
As a result of elite resistance, in some states rulers were able to introduce reforms and in others 
they were not as successful. In Denmark, the king successfully introduced reforms in the 1680s that 
rationalized taxation, consolidated state revenue and increased the independence of the crown from 
aristocratic power (Kain and Baigent 1992, 97). In Catalonia, following the War of the Spanish 
Succession, the crown succeeded in reasserting royal power and imposing new modes of taxation 
(Camarero Bullón, 2007, 152). In Bourbon Spain, the attempt in 1754 to implement a head tax in 
Castile was defeated by noble opposition (Black 2008, 97). In England, “throughout the medieval 
and early modern eras, rulers gave up on developing a centralized system that adequately assessed 
landed wealth or “movable” assets and accepted fixed lump sum payments collected by locally con-
trolled agents” (Kiser and Kane 2001, 198). In Hungary, Joseph II’s attempts to introduce land tax 
reform, based on a comprehensive land registry, failed following a noble revolt in 1789 during 
which the records were destroyed (Black 2008, 97). In France, a few significant attempts at reform 
foundered on the intractable problem of ancien régime privilege (Behrens 1963; Touzery 2002, 138-
139). 
 
Tax reforms in the early modern period had significant implications for the levels of tax, its distri-
bution and state-society relations but these reforms were not implemented to the same extent in 
  10 
every state. In the next section we explore theoretically how variation in the extent of early modern 
reforms may have had long-term implications. 
  
Theoretical Discussion 
 
Why should we expect the outcomes of tax reforms hundreds of years ago to impact on fiscal out-
comes today? Three bodies of literature support the suggestion that developments in early modern 
states may have an impact on contemporary outcomes. First, it is supported by the literature on 
path dependency, which emphasizes the ways in which institutions replicate and persist as the in-
centives of actors become inscribed within the prevailing institutional structures. The high degree 
of path dependency in tax systems has been particularly emphasized: “once established, tax systems 
last until the end of the government that instituted them” (Ames and Rapp 1977, 177). Tax reform 
is a “revolutionary undertaking” that is inherently politically risky and hence the basic contours of 
tax systems are preserved for hundreds of years (Kiser and Kane 2001). Second, a growing body of 
literature emphasizes the long-term impact of early institutions on divergent levels of development 
today (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002; Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman 2002; Micha-
lopoulos and Papaioannou 2013). Third, the fiscal sociology literature discussed above sees the 
early modern period as formative for European states (Ertman 1997; Tilly 1990). To the best of our 
knowledge, the impact of the differences that emerged in this period on later tax outcomes has not 
been tested.  
 
Furthermore, an important question is, ‘what are the mechanisms through which early modern tax 
systems might persist?’ Following recent research that has emphasized the persistence of historical 
institutional legacies through mechanisms of both formal institutions and informal ones - values, 
beliefs and norms (Becker et al 2015); we investigate two mechanisms that matter for tax outcomes 
that can require a longer time period to develop: state capacity and social norms.  
 
State Capacity 
 
All European states ultimately reformed their tax systems by moving to direct allocation and collec-
tion of taxes by state officials, yet significant differences in tax capacity still exist (Besley and 
Persson 2014; Prichard, Cobham and Goodall 2014).  The first plausible mechanism therefore is 
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that the degree of state capacity acquired during the early modern period persisted through formal 
institutions.  
 
As Levi has argued, “the history of state revenue production is the history of the evolution of the 
state” (1988, 1). Where states rationalized and centralized tax systems in the early modern period 
they increased the “hard power” of the state in terms of bureaucratic and monitoring capacity. As 
has been well documented, collecting taxes in a rational, centralized way requires bureaucratic de-
velopment (Brewer 1989). It also requires the state to increase its monitoring capacity. For example, 
to collect land taxes the state used such innovations as property registers and cadastral maps – 
large-scale cartographic records of individual land parcels that successfully linked the in-depth in-
formation on this key economic asset with their users in a single record. These enabled rulers to 
rationalize taxation by making the quality and the use of economic assets, as well as their owners (or 
users), visible to the state (Kain and Baigent 1992). Thus, states had higher infrastructural state 
capacity where they collected taxes directly, rather than relying on elites. 
 
Relatedly, states that reformed their tax systems in the early modern period developed the ability to 
broadcast power more evenly over people and territory. The reach of the state is a critical but often 
overlooked aspect of state capacity. As Herbst has argued, “states are only viable if they are able to 
control the territory defined by their borders” (2000, 3). The unevenness of state power and quality 
of government in contemporary European states at the sub-national level has been clearly demon-
strated (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014) and shown to impact on economic outcomes (Nis-
totskaya, Charron and Lapuente 2015).  
 
If the outcome of the early modern tax reforms led to differing levels in the extent and strength of 
state capacity, this may have set states on divergent paths in their development of state capacity 
(D’Arcy and Nistotskaya forthcoming). Political institutions, particularly those of the state, have 
been argued to be highly path dependent (Pierson 2000). The resulting differences in the levels of 
capacity today could then impact on taxation both directly, as it is essential for revenue extraction, 
and indirectly, as state capacity is necessary for delivering public goods necessary to upholding the 
fiscal contract (Besley and Persson 2014).  
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Social Norms 
 
A body of literature suggests that even if formal institutions change or disappear they can have 
persistent effects through the mechanism of norms (Becker et al 2015; Putnam 1993; Tabellini 
2010). Since norms are quasi-inertial forces (Gambetta 1987), they are not necessarily directly re-
flective of immediate conditions, but rather have evolved over time out of the interactions between 
states and populations over the longue durée. Norms are part of an institutional complex which, as 
Greif has argued, “is not a static optimal response to economic needs, [but rather] a reflection of an 
historical process in which past economic, political, social, and cultural features interrelate and have 
a lasting impact on the nature and economic implications of a society’s institutions” (1998, 82). In 
light of this, the claim that the outcomes of past interactions with the state have an effect today 
through the mechanism of social norms seems plausible and has been found to have empirical sup-
port (Becker et al 2015).  
 
In terms of the social norms that matter for tax compliance, trust in authorities, particularly the 
authorities responsible for implementation of laws, is argued to have a critical impact (Cummings et 
al 2009; Levi, Sachs and Tyler 2009; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler 2010). 
One of the best theorized mechanisms that links trust in authorities to tax compliance, and citizens’ 
compliance with law in general (Tyler 1990), is procedural fairness or impartiality in the implemen-
tation of political power (Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Teorell 2008).2 This view is supported by 
the empirical literature showing that willingness to pay taxes is higher when individuals perceive 
that tax affairs are administered fairly (Slemrod 1992; D’Arcy 2011).   
 
If we conceive trust in authorities as a norm that emerges over the longer term out of the interac-
tion between the state and citizens, and that it is determined by perceptions of the degree of fair-
ness and impartiality of state institutions, then it seems plausible that the early modern tax reforms 
may have an impact through this mechanism. As detailed above, the outcome of early modern tax 
reforms had distributional consequences, and determined whether more direct and fairer (com-
pared to feudal taxation) fiscal contracts between subjects and states emerged. Where tax became 
more centralized and rationalized the tax burden was distributed more fairly and, though it could 
                                                     
2
 Although some conceptualize trust in authorities as citizens’ judgement that the authorities will deliver on their promis-
es, linking it to pro-compliance norms, they also acknowledge their conception of trust as intertwined with procedural 
fairness (Levy, Sacks and Tyler 2009, 356). 
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increase, ordinary people were in a better position to negotiate directly with the state. They entered 
into a direct, vertical fiscal contract. In Sweden, the above-discussed regular interaction between 
crown officials and the population developed tolerable administration and a situation whereby the 
state was seen as the proper medium for solving problems from an early stage (Hallenberg 2012; 
Hallenberg, Holm, Johansson 2008). A direct and fair fiscal contract between the state and society 
established in the past may then have led to higher levels of trust in authorities, supportive of high-
er tax compliance today.  
 
The above theoretical discussion informs the following hypothesis, and two sub-hypotheses about 
the mechanisms: 
 
H1: all other things being equal, European countries where early modern tax reforms were 
more comprehensive collect more tax revenues today, relative to countries where such re-
forms were of a more limited character. 
 
MH1: all other things being equal, European countries where early modern tax reforms were 
more comprehensive have higher state capacity today, relative to countries where such re-
forms were of a more limited character. 
 
MH2: all other things being equal, European countries where early modern tax reforms were 
more comprehensive have higher trust in authorities, relative to countries where such re-
forms were of a more limited character. 
 
Data and Method 
 
Measuring the Outcome of Tax Reforms in the Early Modern Period 
 
There are no existing indicators of tax reform in the early modern period to our knowledge.3 We 
construct a new measure of the existence and quality of state-administered cadasters, capturing the 
timing and extent of tax reforms. A cadaster is a methodically arranged inventory of data concern-
ing land, based on a survey of individual land parcels. As two of the foremost experts of cadastral 
                                                     
3
 Dincecco (2009) creates a dichotomous measure of fiscal centralization for the period 1650-1913, which runs outside 
our focus on the early modern period and is only available only for eleven countries. 
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maps explain, “…their essential feature is that they identify property owners, usually by linking 
properties on a map to a written register on which details of the property, such as the owner’s name 
and its area, are recorded” (Kain and Baigent 1992, xviii). During the early modern period land was 
a key economic asset and rulers were primarily interested in cadastral maps because they “provide a 
parsimonious and accurate means of both fairly assessing and permanently recording the tax liabili-
ties of a particular parcel of land” (Kain, 2007, 710). As such they were a key instrument in the 
state’s efforts to reform taxation.  
 
Not all states were able to reform tax systems, as discussed above, because of the resistance of local 
elites, which included resistance to cadastres. Prior to the state having the information cadastres 
provided, landlords could misrepresent the amount of land and its yield, therefore minimizing their 
tax burden and extending their own income. As Scott noted, “the point of the cadastral map and 
land register was precisely to eliminate the fiscal feudalism and rationalize the fiscal take of the 
state” (1998, 38).  For example, the English state did not manage to introduce centralized direct tax 
collection in the early modern period (Daunton 2001) and never managed to introduce a compre-
hensive cadastral map due to the strength of the resistance of the nobility (Kain and Baigent 1992, 
343). In contrast, the Swedish crown, with little resistance from weak nobility, began centralizing 
the tax system in the 1540s, including introducing narrative cadastres and a comprehensive cadas-
tral map of the country in 1628. However, in their Baltic territories the strength of the semi-
independent nobility led to a much less effective cadaster (Kain and Baigent 1992, 72). Thus, the 
presence of an extensive state-administered cadaster is indicative of a state that implemented com-
prehensive tax reform. As such we consider the extent and the quality of cadastral records to be an 
appropriate indicator of the extent of tax reform in the early modern period. We use standardized 
scores of Cadaster for easier interpretation of substantive effects. 
 
Constructing the Cadaster Indicator 
 
In the light of the above discussion, we created an original indicator Cadaster for 42 European coun-
tries, including Turkey and Russia, as accepted in the field (Karaman and Pamuk 2013), for the 
period between 1450 and 1800, a standard definition of the early modern period (Wiesner-Hanks 
2006) (Appendix A).  
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We capture the comprehensiveness of cadasters, our indicator of tax reforms, using two dimen-
sions – its geographic extent and whether it was narrative or cartographic. Narrative cadasters are 
registers or lists of property recording ownership through verbal description, but without a detailed 
cartographic/graphical representation such as provided by a map. Cartographic cadasters are given 
more weight because they are more accurate in terms of measurements of parcels, and are particu-
larly effective in “linking properties on a map to a written register on which details of the property, 
such as the owner’s name and its area, are recorded” (Kain and Baigent 1992, xviii). They give the 
state more detailed information and are therefore a more powerful tool for taxation. 
 
For each year of the period we assigned a score based on the answers to the following three ques-
tions: Was there a state-administered cadaster? Was this cadaster narrative or cartographic? How 
much of the territory of the modern country was covered by the cadaster?  
 
We allocated points for each year as follows: 
 
0:  no cadaster; 
0.25: a narrative cadaster, covering less than 75% of the territory of the modern state; 
0.5:  a narrative cadaster, covering more than 75% of the territory of the modern state; 
0.75: a cartographic cadaster, covering less than 75% of the territory of the modern state; 
1: a cartographic cadaster, covering over 75% of the current territory. 4  
  
This coding schema allows us to take into account changes over time and instances of the reversal 
of tax reforms. For example, from c. 1600 onwards tax farming became the dominant mode of tax 
collection in the Ottoman Empire, having overtaken the previous tax system, based on state-
administered narrative cadasters (tahrir defterleri) which fell out of use.5 Therefore we assigned the 
countries under Ottoman rule a score of .5 between 1450 and 1599, and 0 between 1600 and 1800. 
 
The resulting indicator is the sum of the weighted scores (figure 1). To illustrate, in Sweden in 1530 
rulers began to use narrative cadasters, with coverage of more than 75% of modern Sweden. In 
                                                     
4
 Using a threshold for the percentage of the territory covered by the cadastre enables us to deal with the discrepancy, 
for some countries, between the modern and historical boundaries of the state.  
5
 Although the earliest evidence of tax farming in the Ottoman Empire goes back as far as the later fourteenth century 
(Fleet 2003), the increased use of tax farming is observed in the sixteenth century (Balla and Johnson 2009), making it 
a dominant form of tax collection between c 1600 and 1858, when the obligatory state registration of land was re-
introduced.  
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1628 the Swedish crown started the first, in Europe, state-administered cadastral mapping of the 
territory of the state. Therefore, for each year between 1530 and 1628 (98 years) we assigned the 
score 0.5, and for each year between 1628 and 1800 (172 years) we assign 1. The total weighted 
score is 221. Sweden has the highest Cadaster score, followed by Finland (214) and Netherlands 
(158.25). On the other end of the distribution there are eight countries with the score of zero, in-
cluding the UK and Ireland.6 
 
The information on cadasters is taken from: the UN-sponsored Cadastral Template Project devel-
oped by the International Federation of Surveyors; the Permanent Committee on Cadasters in the 
European Union; specialized academic literature, especially Kain and Baigent (1992).  
 
Dependent and Control Variables 
 
Although there is no clear consensus on measurement in relation to the tax performance of coun-
tries, tax to GDP ratio is the most commonly used as “it allows for effective comparison of cash 
revenues for the same economy as it grows over time, and across economies of different sizes” 
(Cobham 2015). In the main specification we use data from the International Centre for Tax and 
Development (ICTD) by Prichard, Cobham and Goodall 2014. As a robustness check we employ 
the IMF’s government revenues, which is highly correlated in our sample with the ICTD’s total tax 
indicator (r = .95***). We also test the effect of Cadaster on direct tax alone, as this tax is one of the 
most progressive ones, but also most difficult to administer, requiring high state capacity (Lieber-
man 2002, 99).  
 
We employ three measures capturing contemporary state capacity, including both expert evalua-
tions and public perceptions, and capturing different dimensions of state capacity – both general 
and specifically related to tax. The first is the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) composite 
measure of quality of public bureaucracy, extent of corruption and law and order, which is custom-
arily used as a measure of state capacity (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Knutsen 2013). The second is an 
                                                     
6 We do not give scores for the Munster Survey of 1586 or the Down Survey of 1655 (Ireland). These were state-
administered maps of land titles for large landowners, whose intent was not fiscal – they were produced to redistribute 
lands as part of the broader expansion of British control in Ireland after a failed rebellion in 1579-83the Cromwellian 
conquest 1649-53. Since the intent of the Domesday Book (UK) of 1086 – whether it was fiscal, legal or multi-purpose – 
is disputed (for overview see Higham 1993, 8-9), we err on the side of caution and do not assign scores, which sets a 
harder test for our theory as the assignment of a score for the UK does improve the fit of our model. 
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indicator measuring corruption in national tax authorities, from Transparency International. The 
third is perceptions of the efficiency of the tax authority from the 2008 European Social Survey 
(ESS).  
 
To gauge trust in authorities we use questions from the ESS. First, following Kirchler, Hoelzl, and 
Wahl (2008), who define trust in tax authorities as “a general opinion of individuals and social 
groups that the tax authorities are benevolent and work beneficially for the common good” (212), 
we employ a specific question on the impartiality of tax authorities in dealing with citizens from 
Round 4. Second, we use the questions on trust in the legal system and police – prominent institu-
tions of the implementation of political power – that were utilized as the key measure of trust in 
authorities in the previous research on tax compliance (Torgler 2007). Finally, we use a question 
that asks respondents if they would prefer more tax and more public goods or less tax and less 
public goods as a proxy of their willingness to enter into a fiscal contract with the state, which is 
reflective of trust in the state.  
 
Constrained by the number of observations, we employ across all models the four control variables 
that, according to the literature, control for the other most important determinants of tax: the 
number of years since the inception of democracy (DEMY), the spatial organization of government 
(UNITAR), level of economic development (EconDevelop) and its short-term rate of change 
(GROWTH). Years of democracy and unitarism reflect two major political and constitutional dif-
ferences among the countries that have been found to be salient institutional factors affecting the 
tax performance (Gerring, Thacker and Moreno 2005; Melo 2007).7 The Economic Complexity 
Index (ECI) is a novel measure of economic development, which is based on the evaluation of 
complexity and diversification of products in an economy (Hausmann et al 2008). We use this indi-
cator, rather than GDP per capita, as our dependent variables for tax are already normalized by 
GDP and because it captures the structure of the economy as well as its size, which is important for 
tax. Most of the variables are measured as averages for several years to limit the impact of yearly 
fluctuations. Full description of the variables, years of measurement and data sources are provided 
in Appendix B. Appendix C provides summary statistics. 
 
                                                     
7 Constrained by the degrees of freedom, we use democracy years to control for both levels of democracy and age of 
democracy. As our sample is European countries, there is limited variation in levels of democracy, but significant varia-
tion in age.  
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Results 
 
Graph 1 visualizes the bivariate relation between zCadaster and the ICTD’s total tax revenue, sug-
gesting that on average the linear relation fits the data well. Table 1 reports the results of the regres-
sion analysis of the relationship between zCadaster and tax revenues under all the above-specified 
controls. Across all three models, the impact of zCadaster is significant at least at the 95% level, and 
signed as expected: higher values of cadaster are associated with higher tax revenues.8 The quantita-
tive impact of our measure of the extent of the early modern tax reforms is also substantial: one 
standard deviation increase in zCadaster is associated with 2 to 3 percent increase in tax revenues on 
average. Together the predictors explain more than 50% of the variance of the total tax revenue 
(models 1 and 3) and about two thirds of the direct tax revenues (model 2). We reran the models 
with GDP per capita as an alternative measure for the levels of economic development and two 
alternative measures for years of democracy (not reported), and model specification (for example, 
by controlling for income inequality or ethnic, language or religious fractionalization), finding the 
results to be largely similar to those reported in the main specifications (Appendix E).  
 
In addition, to control for the argument that more recently developed cadasters may matter more 
than ones that were developed in the more distant past, we reran all regressions with zCadaster’s 
scores being discounted by 5% for each 50 years between 1800 and 1450 as per the original formula 
in Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman 2002, who measure the age of the contemporary state. The 
results are substantively similar to the main analysis (Appendix F). Overall these findings provide 
strong support for H1 in that those European countries that more comprehensively reformed their 
tax systems during the early modern period exhibit higher tax revenues today, relative to European 
countries in which such reforms were less successful. 
 
Testing Mechanisms 
 
Hypotheses MH1 and MH2 relate to the two mechanisms through which the outcomes of early 
modern tax reforms may be relevant to present day state capacity and trust in authorities.  
 
                                                     
8
 zCadaster is consistently significant across all model specifications, for details see Appendix D. 
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Table 2 reports the estimates of three fully specified models of the impact of zCadaster on contem-
porary state capacity. Across all three models zCadaster is significant and signed in the expected 
direction. In models 1 and 2, higher values of our key explanatory variable are associated with high-
er quality of government in general and higher efficiency of tax authorities in particularly. In model 
3, higher values of zCadaster are associated with lower corruption in tax authorities. Ranging from 
49 to 83 percent, the R2 evidences the goodness of fit between the models and the data. This analy-
sis provides support to HM1, suggesting that where European rulers implemented more compre-
hensive tax reform during the period under study, one can observe higher state capacity today. 
 
Regarding the trust in authorities (table 3), zCadaster estimates are significant at the level of .05 or 
above across all models, and its higher values are associated with higher levels of trust in different 
state authorities (models 1-3) and citizens’ propensity to enter the fiscal contract (model 4) as per 
MH2. Among the trust in authorities variables, zCadaster has the largest effect on perceived impar-
tiality of the tax authority and trust in the legal system. Models 1-3 fit the data well, explaining 64 to 
71 per cent of the variance in the variables. Admittedly, R2 in model 4 is rather low (.38), suggesting 
potentially omitted variables, as for instance ideological preferences. We conclude that the data 
provides strong support to hypothesis MH2.  
 
Overall, the proposition that early European tax history has not lost its relevance for contemporary 
tax outcomes finds support in the data. On average, European countries where rulers reformed 
their tax systems earlier and more comprehensively, as measured by the timing, coverage and quali-
ty of historical cadasters, have higher tax revenues, greater state capacity and higher trust in authori-
ties today. The behavior of our main explanatory variable is robust to the inclusion to a number of 
demanding control variables, including democracy and the levels of economic development. We are 
also reasonably confident that our analysis is not biased by the problem of reverse causality since 
the data in the Cadaster variable is separated from the outcomes variable by centuries.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have explored the nature of early modern tax reforms and suggested why and in 
what ways they might impact on contemporary tax states. We argue that the extent and depth of 
these reforms had consequences for the capacity of the state, distribution of the tax burden, and the 
relationship between the state, elites and ordinary people. Thus, depending on the extent of re-
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forms, states were set on trajectories that either led to the emergence of a stronger and more trust-
worthy state, or they were not.  
 
To test our theoretical propositions we constructed a novel indicator that captures the extent and 
depth of early modern tax reforms. Our hypotheses find support in the data. On average, those 
European countries that experienced more comprehensive tax reform in the early modern period 
have higher tax revenues. The data also provides support to our hypotheses stipulating the mecha-
nisms through which this may have happened: extensive tax reforms in the early modern period are 
associated with higher state capacity and trust in authorities, measured in a number of ways. These 
associations are robust to the inclusion of a variety of demanding control variables.  
 
There are a number of aspects of our theory and data that require further development. In com-
mon with many accounts that work within the theoretical framework of path dependency, in this 
paper we assume cumulative, self-reinforcing pathways that keep institutions on particular trajecto-
ries. However, there is certainly some degree of fluctuation in tax systems, state capacity and reve-
nue levels over time even if the broad trajectory remains. For example, much as Sweden was a for-
midable tax state in the early modern period, it was relatively late in adopting more modern taxes 
like income tax. The main avenue for future research is to examine exactly how institutional persis-
tence and institutional change occurred in European tax systems. While case-studies are certainly an 
obvious choice for such explorations (Balla and Johnson 2009; Johnson and Koyama 2014; Pamuk 
2014), we believe that the ongoing time-series expansion of the data on state-administered cadasters 
will enable us to address these issues in a more comparative, yet fine-grained and dynamic fashion.  
Although great care was taken in constructing the Cadaster measure, and the empirical tests present-
ed here provide a great deal of confidence in its validity and strength as an indicator of the state of 
the tax state in early modern Europe, there is still room for measurement error, as suggested by 
outliers, such as Armenia, whose modest record of tax revenues does not square well with its score 
on Cadaster (graph 1). While land was a critical asset during the period under consideration, equiva-
lent measures in other areas of tax reform related to other assets may be needed to develop an all-
encompassing indicator. This will also help to address the zero values for Cadaster for such coun-
tries as the UK and Ireland.  
 
The recent fiscal crises in some European states have again highlighted that these states vary con-
siderably in their tax systems and tax capacities. Thus there is a very contemporary reason for ask-
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ing questions about early modern tax states. If the reasons behind this variation are deeply rooted in 
long-run historical processes, we need to be aware of this to know what kind of reform may, or 
may not, be possible. 
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FIGURE 1, CADASTER IN 42 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1450-1800. SOURCE: AUTHORS’ ORIGINAL 
DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
GRAPH 1, CADASTER AND TOTAL TAX REVENUE (2001-2005, AVERAGED, ICTD). 
 
 
Note: Total Tax Revenue as % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged, ICTD; Cadaster – authors’ original data. 
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TABLE 1, CADASTER AND CONTEMPORARY TAX PERFORMANCE 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES    
        
zCadaster 1.82** 2.12** 3.11*** 
 
(0.83) (0.87) (1.08) 
EconDevelop 4.52** 5.79*** 3.19 
 
(1.87) (1.95) (2.41) 
GROWTH -0.69 -0.04 -0.87 
 
(0.49) (0.50) (0.63) 
DEMY 0.01 0.06** 0.03 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
UNITAR 1.42 0.51 0.24 
 
(1.53) (1.56) (1.98) 
Constant 29.04*** 10.90** 38.22*** 
 
(4.43) (4.55) (5.73) 
    
Observations 36 35 36 
R-squared 0.54 0.67 0.52 
 
Note: dependent variables: Total Tax Revenue as % of GDP, ICTD, 2001-2005, averaged; Direct Taxes as % of GDP, 
ICTD, 2001-2005, averaged; Government Revenue as % of GDP, IMF, 2001-2005, averaged. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
TABLE 2, CADASTER AND CURRENT STATE CAPACITY 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
  
 
        
zCadaster 0.03* 0.23** -0.20** 
 
(0.01) (0.11) (0.08) 
EconDevelop 0.14*** 0.29 -0.56*** 
 
(0.04) (0.27) (0.19) 
GROWTH -0.02** -0.10 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.04) 
DEMY 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
UNITAR 0.09*** -0.02 -0.12 
 
(0.03) (0.19) (0.15) 
Constant 0.43*** 4.99*** 3.92*** 
 
(0.09) (0.68) (0.41) 
   
 
Observations 33 29 31 
R-squared 0.83 0.49 0.64 
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Note: dependent variables: ICRG_qog, 2001-2005, averaged; citizens’ perception of efficiency of tax authorities, ESS, 2008; 
experts’ perception of corruption in tax authorities, TI, 2007. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 
TABLE 3, CADASTER AND TRUST IN AUTHORITIES 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
    
          
zCadaster 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.34** 0.19** 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.08) 
EconDevelop 0.56 0.23 0.28 -0.04 
 
(0.35) (0.40) (0.33) (0.21) 
GROWTH -0.11 -0.15 -0.27*** -0.01 
 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) 
DEMY 0.01 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
UNITART 0.38 0.13 0.41 -0.03 
 
(0.25) (0.30) (0.25) (0.15) 
Constant 3.63*** 4.00*** 5.20*** 4.87*** 
 
(0.86) (0.99) (0.82) (0.53) 
     
Observations 29 31 31 29 
R-squared 0.66 0.64 0.71 0.38 
 
Note: dependent variables: Citizens’ perception of impartiality of tax authorities, 2008, ESS; Trust in the legal system, 2004-
2014, ESS; trust in police, ESS, 2004-2014; Citizens’ willingness to enter tax contract, ESS, 2008. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: List of countries in the sample 
 
 
Albania 
Armenia 
Austria 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Kosovo 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia, FYR 
Moldova 
Montenegro 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Serbia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
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Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
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Appendix B: Variables - Description and Sources 
 
 
DV: TAX PERFORMANCE 
TotalTax: total tax revenue, including social contributions, % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged (Ar-
menia 2000, 2001, 2003-2005; Macedonia 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006-2007). Source: the ICTD Gov-
ernment Revenue Dataset (Prichard, Cobham, and Goodall, 2014). 
DirectTax: direct taxes including social contributions, excluding resource revenue, general govern-
ment , % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged (Armenia 2001, 2003-2005; Macedonia 2001-2002). Source: 
the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (Prichard, Cobham, and Goodall, 2014) 
IMF_Rev: General government revenue, including taxes, social contributions, grants receivable and 
other revenue, % of GDP. 2001-2005 averaged. Croatia and Turkey 2002-2005 averaged. Source: 
IMF, The QoG standard dataset, version Jan 2015 (imf_rev). 
DV: STATE CAPACITY 
ICRG_qog: the mean value of the ICRG variables “Corruption”, “Law and Order” and “Bureau-
cracy Quality”, scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government. The score for Ser-
bia and Montenegro are from the united “Serbia and Montenegro” entity. 2001-2005, averaged. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), The QoG standard dataset, version Jan 2015 
(icrg_qog). 
Tax_corruptibility: To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be 
affected by corruption? Tax  revenue. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt). 2004 (for most 
of the cases), 2007 for the rest. Source: Transparency International, The QoG standard dataset, 
version Jan 2015 (gcb_ptax).  
Tax_efficiency: How efficient do you think the tax authorities are at things like handling queries on 
time, avoiding mistakes and preventing fraud? 0 (extremely inefficient in doing their job) - 10 (ex-
tremely efficient). All scores are adjusted by Design and Population size weights. Source: European 
Social Survey, 2008, Question D31.  
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DV: TRUST in AUTHORITIES 
Impartiality: Do the tax authorities in [country] give special advantages to certain people or deal 
with everyone equally? 0 – (Give special advantage to certain people) – 10 (Deal with everyone 
equally). All scores are adjusted by Design and Population size weights. Source: European Social 
Survey, Round 4 Data, 2008, Question D33.  
Trust in the legal system: On a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions 
I read out. 0 mean s you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. All 
scores are adjusted by Design and Population size weights. Source: European Social Survey, 2004-
2014, Round 7 (2014): Austria, Belgium, Czech R, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland. Round 6 (2012): Albania, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, UK, and 
Portugal. Round 5 (2010): Croatia, Greece. Round 4 (2008): Turkey, Romania, and Latvia. Round 2 
(2004): Luxembourg, Question B3. 
Trust in police: On a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read 
out. 0 mean s you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. All 
scores are adjusted by Design and Population size weights. Source: European Social Survey, 2004-
2014 (countries per round as above), Question B4. 
Willingness to enter fiscal contract: Many social benefits and services are paid for by taxes. If the 
government had to choose between increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and 
services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benefits and services, which should they 
do? 0 (Decrease taxes and social spending a lot) – 10 (Increase taxes and social spending a lot). All 
scores are adjusted by Design and Population size weights. Source: European Social Survey, Round 
4, 2008, Question D34.  
IV and CONTROLS: 
zCadaster: Extend and quality of state-administered fiscal cadasters, 1450-1800, normalized. Source: 
Constructed by the authors. 
UNITARISM: 0= federal (elective regional legislatures plus conditional recognition of subnational 
authority), 1=semifederal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which 
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constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government) or 2 = unitary. 1990-2000 aver-
age. (Armenia 1992-1995, 1998-2000; Belarus 1992-1995; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1994, 
1996-2000).  Source: Gerring et al 2005, The QoG standard dataset, version Jan 2015 (gtm_unit) 
and constructed by the authors for countries that are not covered by the Gerring et al’s sample. 
Economic Development: Economic Complexity Index, a measure of complexity and diversification 
of products in an economy, an alternative measure of economic development. 1996-2000, averaged. 
Source: Hausmann et al 2008.  
GROWTH: annual percentage rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency, 
2001-2004, averaged. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, The QoG standard dataset, 
version Jan 2015 (wdi_gdpgr). 
DEMY: the number of years under democratic rule (Polity 6 or more) since the inception of de-
mocracy until 2000. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: 
 
zCadaster_5%: extent and quality of state-administered cadasters, discounted by 5% for every 50 
years between 1800 and 1450, normalized. Source: Constructed by the authors 
 
Language fraction: reflects probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will 
not belong to the same linguistic group. The higher the number, the more fractionalized society. 
Years:  2001-2005, averaged. Source: The QoG standard dataset, version Jan 2015 (al_language) 
 
GINI index: a measurement of the income distribution of a country’s residents, ranging from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality) Year: 2002. Source: the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
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Appendix C: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable N mean sd min max 
      
Response variables: contemporary tax outcomes 
Cadaster 42 64.48 55.94 0 221 
zCadaster 42 3.55e-10 1 -1.15 2.8 
Total Tax Revenue, ICTD 41 33.06 6.94 16.1 47.6 
Government Revenue, IMF 39 39.2 9.15 16.47 56.15 
Direct Tax Revenue, ICTD 40 19.24 8.19 2.66 35.43 
      
Response variables: contemporary state capacity 
ICRG_qog 38 .68 .20 .34 1 
Tax authorities efficiency 30 5.07 .77 3.01 6.76 
Tax authorities corruptibility 33 3.07 .68 1.72 4.22 
      
Response Variables: trust in government 
Tax authorities impartiality 30 4.88 1.18 2.68 7.03 
Trust in the legal system 34 4.69 1.42 1.89 7.4 
Trust in police 34 5.64 1.28 2 7.9 
Willingness to enter fiscal contract 30 5.04 .54 3.54 5.98 
      
Control variables 
Years under democratic rule 42 40.19 44.05 0 152 
Economic Complexity Index 36 1.01 .67 -.35 2.21 
Annual GDP growth 39 4.07 2.62 .58 11.81 
Unitarism 41 1.62 .6 0 2 
      
Robustness checks 
zCadaster_5%   42 -4.61 e-09 1 -1.25 2.8 
GINI 41 .32 .04 .26 .41 
Language fractionalization 32 .26 .2 .02 .64 
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Appendix D: Cadaster and Contemporary Tax performance 
 
TABLE 1, CADASTER AND TOTAL TAX REVENUE 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
     
            
zCadaster 2.65** 2.10** 1.96** 1.97** 1.82** 
 
(1.01) (0.82) (0.81) (0.82) (0.83) 
EconDevelopment 
 
5.64*** 4.10** 3.91** 4.52** 
  
(1.30) (1.59) (1.74) (1.87) 
GROWTH 
  
-0.72 -0.67 -0.69 
   
(0.45) (0.49) (0.49) 
DEMY 
   
0.01 0.01 
    
(0.03) (0.03) 
UNITAR 
    
1.42 
     
(1.53) 
Constant 33.07*** 27.65*** 32.04*** 31.72*** 29.04*** 
 
(1.01) (1.56) (3.12) (3.36) (4.43) 
      
Observations 41 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.15 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.54 
Note: dependent variable: Total Tax Revenue as % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged, ICTD. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 2. CADASTER AND TOTAL TAX REVENUE, ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
     
            
zCadaster 3.83*** 3.32*** 3.11*** 3.13*** 3.11*** 
 
(1.31) (1.07) (1.04) (1.04) (1.08) 
EconDevelop 
 
6.07*** 3.82* 3.09 3.19 
  
(1.69) (2.05) (2.22) (2.41) 
GROWTH 
  
-1.06* -0.86 -0.87 
   
(0.58) (0.62) (0.63) 
DEMY 
   
0.03 0.03 
    
(0.03) (0.03) 
UNITAR 
    
0.24 
     
(1.98) 
Constant 39.21*** 33.49*** 39.91*** 38.68*** 38.22*** 
 
(1.34) (2.03) (4.03) (4.28) (5.73) 
      
Observations 39 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.19 0.46 0.51 0.52 0.52 
Note: dependent variable: Government Revenue as % of GDP, IMF, 2001-2005, averaged. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 3, CADASTER AND DIRECT TAX REVENUE 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
     
            
zCadaster 3.07** 2.09** 2.04** 2.18** 2.12** 
 
(1.23) (0.88) (0.89) (0.84) (0.87) 
EconDevelop 
 
8.04*** 7.20*** 5.56*** 5.79*** 
  
(1.37) (1.74) (1.79) (1.95) 
GROWTH 
  
-0.39 -0.03 -0.04 
   
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) 
DEMY 
   
0.06** 0.06** 
    
(0.03) (0.03) 
UNITAR 
    
0.51 
     
(1.56) 
Constant 19.36*** 11.67*** 14.08*** 11.87*** 10.90** 
 
(1.22) (1.65) (3.45) (3.39) (4.55) 
      
Observations 40 35 35 35 35 
R-squared 0.14 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.67 
Note: dependent variable: Direct Taxes as % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged, ITCD; Standard errors are in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix E: Robustness Checks  
 
 
TABLE 1, CADASTER, CONTEMPORARY TAX PERFORMANCE, STATE CAPACITY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, CONTROLLING FOR INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Tax Outcomes State Capacity Trust in Government 
                      
zCadaster 1.55* 1.87** 2.75** 0.03* 0.26** -0.14 0.53*** 0.50*** 0.38** 0.22** 
 
(0.81) (0.85) (1.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.08) 
EconDevelop 2.84 3.99* 0.97 0.18*** 0.72** -0.39** 1.12*** 0.57 0.96** 0.21 
 
(2.00) (2.11) (2.58) (0.04) (0.31) (0.19) (0.39) (0.44) (0.40) (0.23) 
DEMY 0.04 0.07*** 0.07** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
UNITAR 1.17 0.38 -0.08 0.09*** 0.02 -0.14 0.43* 0.14 0.45 -0.01 
 
(1.45) (1.50) (1.88) (0.03) (0.20) (0.14) (0.24) (0.31) (0.29) (0.14) 
GINI -61.53** -42.62 -79.71** 0.05 4.89 5.49** 7.19 2.13 5.37 4.70 
 
(26.32) (27.13) (33.96) (0.59) (4.13) (2.54) (5.10) (6.14) (5.59) (3.01) 
Constant 46.95*** 25.95** 61.62*** 0.26 2.47 2.08** 0.24 2.28 1.52 3.05** 
 
(9.93) (10.28) (12.81) (0.23) (1.58) (0.93) (1.96) (2.33) (2.12) (1.16) 
           
Observations 36 35 36 33 29 31 29 31 31 29 
R-squared 0.58 0.69 0.57 0.79 0.48 0.70 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.44 
 
Note: dependent variables: (1) Direct Taxes as % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged, ITCD; (2) Direct Taxes as % of GDP, ICTD, 2001-2005, averaged; (3) Government Revenue 
as % of GDP, IMF, 2001-2005, averaged; (4) ICRG_qog, 2001-2005, averaged; (5) Citizens’ perception of efficiency of tax authorities, ESS, 2008; (6) Experts’ perception of 
corruption in tax authorities, TI, 2007; (7) Citizens’ perception of impartiality of tax authorities, 2008, ESS; (8) Trust in the legal system, 2004-2014, ESS; (9) Trust in police, 
ESS, 2004-2014; (10) Citizens’ willingness to enter tax contract, ESS, 2008. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 2. CADASTER, CONTEMPORARY TAX PERFORMANCE, STATE CAPACITY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, CONTROLLING FOR LAN-
GUAGE FRACTIONALIZATION 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Tax Outcomes State Capacity Trust in Government 
                      
zCadaster 1.77** 2.61*** 2.91*** 0.02 0.23* -0.18* 0.44*** 0.51** 0.36** 0.20** 
 
(0.85) (0.84) (1.00) (0.02) (0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.09) 
EconDevelop 5.93*** 4.49** 5.50** 0.19*** 0.54* -0.65*** 0.97** 0.45 0.65* 0.04 
 
(1.88) (1.89) (2.21) (0.04) (0.30) (0.22) (0.36) (0.41) (0.37) (0.20) 
DEMY 0.02 0.06** 0.04 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 0.01** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
UNITAR 2.70 -0.68 1.49 0.09** 0.11 -0.25 0.75* 0.06 0.13 0.15 
 
(1.97) (1.91) (2.32) (0.04) (0.31) (0.22) (0.37) (0.44) (0.39) (0.21) 
Language fractionalization -1.76 -2.44 -4.05 -0.01 0.22 -0.06 0.92 -1.12 -1.39 0.24 
 
(4.97) (4.93) (5.86) (0.10) (0.85) (0.53) (1.02) (1.19) (1.07) (0.58) 
Constant 22.44*** 14.62*** 30.67*** 0.27** 3.92*** 4.30*** 1.80* 3.39*** 4.37*** 4.27*** 
 
(5.12) (5.07) (6.04) (0.10) (0.85) (0.55) (1.02) (1.12) (1.01) (0.58) 
           
Observations 30 29 30 29 26 27 26 28 28 26 
R-squared 0.58 0.72 0.61 0.80 0.45 0.63 0.67 0.62 0.60 0.50 
Note: dependent variables: (1) Direct Taxes as % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged, ITCD; (2) Direct Taxes as % of GDP, ICTD, 2001-2005, averaged; (3) Government Revenue as 
% of GDP, IMF, 2001-2005, averaged; (4) ICRG_qog, 2001-2005, averaged; (5) Citizens’ perception of efficiency of tax authorities, ESS, 2008; (6) Experts’ perception of corrup-
tion in tax authorities, TI, 2007; (7) Citizens’ perception of impartiality of tax authorities, 2008, ESS; (8) Trust in the legal system, 2004-2014, ESS; (9) Trust in police, ESS, 
2004-2014; (10) Citizens’ willingness to enter tax contract, ESS, 2008. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX F, CADASTER, DISCOUNTED AT 5% PER EVERY 50 YEARS BETWEEN 1800 AND 1450, CONTEMPORARY TAX PERFORMANCE, 
STATE CAPACITY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Tax Outcomes State Capacity Trust in Government 
                      
zCadaster_5% 1.88** 2.20** 3.17*** 0.03** 0.24** -0.21** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.36** 0.20** 
 
(0.84) (0.88) (1.08) (0.01) (0.11) (0.08) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.08) 
EconDevelop 4.30** 5.53*** 2.83 0.14*** 0.26 -0.53** 0.51 0.18 0.24 -0.06 
 
(1.87) (1.96) (2.43) (0.04) (0.27) (0.19) (0.34) (0.40) (0.33) (0.21) 
GROWTH -0.71 -0.06 -0.90 -0.02** -0.11 0.01 -0.11 -0.15 -0.27*** -0.01 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.63) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) 
DEMY 0.01 0.06** 0.03 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
UNITAR 1.38 0.46 0.18 0.09*** -0.02 -0.11 0.37 0.13 0.40 -0.03 
 
(1.53) (1.56) (1.98) (0.03) (0.19) (0.15) (0.24) (0.30) (0.25) (0.15) 
Constant 29.34*** 11.27** 38.72*** 0.43*** 5.02*** 3.88*** 3.69*** 4.04*** 5.24*** 4.89*** 
 
(4.43) (4.55) (5.73) (0.09) (0.68) (0.41) (0.85) (0.99) (0.81) (0.53) 
           
Observations 36 35 36 33 29 31 29 31 31 29 
R-squared 0.54 0.67 0.53 0.83 0.50 0.65 0.68 0.64 0.71 0.38 
Note: dependent variables: (1) Direct Taxes as % of GDP, 2001-2005, averaged, ITCD; (2) Direct Taxes as % of GDP, ICTD, 2001-2005, averaged; (3) Government Revenue as 
% of GDP, IMF, 2001-2005, averaged; (4) ICRG_qog, 2001-2005, averaged; (5) Citizens’ perception of efficiency of tax authorities, ESS, 2008; (6) Experts’ perception of corrup-
tion in tax authorities, TI, 2007; (7) Citizens’ perception of impartiality of tax authorities, 2008, ESS; (8) Trust in the legal system, 2004-2014, ESS; (9) Trust in police, ESS, 
2004-2014; (10) Citizens’ willingness to enter tax contract, ESS, 2008. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
